ARMY GROUND RISK-MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Countermeasure

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Deployment Safety

Where the Rubber Meets the Road

2004 APEX® AWARDS FOR PUBLICATION EXCELLENCE

Countermeasure
ARMY GROUND RISK-MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

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DASAF'S CORNER
From the Director of Army Safety

The Next Greatest Generation
Grasp the Knowledge, Sharpen the Skills, and Retain the Abilities

On a recent trip to Washington, D.C., the sight of the World War II Memorial brought clarity to a message I've heard in the last several weeks. The World War II Memorial honors the 16 million Americans who served in the armed forces, the more than 400,000 who died, and all who supported the war effort from home. Symbolic of the defining event of the 20th century, the memorial is a monument to the spirit, sacrifice, and commitment of the American people. On May 27, 2004, the public was invited to the unveiling ceremony to view this tribute to America's "Greatest Generation."

As we look to the future, the Global War on Terrorism is demanding that our 21st century Army and its Soldiers embrace the spirit of the Greatest Generation. We are an incredible Army—resourced for success and transforming to meet tomorrow's challenges. Our Soldiers are returning from battle with a degree of knowledge and experience that, at a minimum, would take years of schooling and rigorous training to match. Our duty is to grasp the knowledge, sharpen the skills, and retain the abilities of the Army's newest generation.

Grasp the knowledge of our junior leaders and coach "composite risk." By focusing energy on our current combat leaders, we can simultaneously capture lessons learned and implement control measures that will mandate how warfighting and training will be conducted in the 21st century. Specifically, we must not lose the insight of the leaders who understand tactical risk firsthand, or those who experienced accidental risk personally. We are not there yet. After visiting several units in Iraq last month, it was clear that we still have a "mental barrier" to blending tactical and accidental risks into a "composite" picture. That is, to view the risk of losing combat power holistically. When you are dead, you're dead—regardless of whether a bullet or an accident took you out of play. Our Mission Ready Exercise (MRX), Pre-deployment Site Survey (PDSS), Relief in Place (RIP), and Military Decision-Making-Process (MDMP) must come together in a way that not only captures lessons learned from our junior leaders, but also coaches the art of "composite" risk mitigation.

When I ask new convoy commanders about their biggest threat, most say with great confidence "IEDs!" (Improvised Explosive Devices). When I ask new air mission commanders what their biggest threat is, they say without a doubt it's "MANPADS!" (Man-Portable Air Defense System) and "RPGs!" (Rocket Propelled Grenades). Ask a Soldier in the mess tent, he'll say "rocket attacks in tent city." Sound familiar?

Approaching Soldiers hardened by combat, I often get a different response. The seasoned convoy commander tells me "fatigue" is his number one hazard because he's mitigated the tactical risks with "TTPs" (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures). The seasoned air mission commander tells me that a "mid-air collision" is his number one hazard for the same reason. **These Soldiers are adequately balancing the composite risk—"they get it!!"** The weathered cook who tells me, "I've heard the rounds go off… and I'm more concerned about getting hit by a negligent discharge (ND) than shrapnel from a rocket attack," also "gets it"—there are far more NDs than rocket attacks.

We must not return home to the same old FTX and common task training (CTT). Our rising leaders are more than capable of training and risk managing with a few simplicities, such as fighter management, solid pre-mission planning, and strong troop leading procedures. These leaders have personal combat experience and will learn to defeat both enemies of composite risk.

Sharpen the skills of our already highly trained and hardened Soldiers. Let's get the job done and be smart about it by allowing more flexibility to deal with the less-predictable tactical risk. The Chief of Staff, Army, said, "We cannot be risk averse, but we can be smart about managing risk." The best way is to sharpen the skills of our junior leaders and provide them with expert knowledge. They are skilled, seasoned warriors who will get the job done.

We must capture the importance of pre-mission planning for every mission. Nearly all infantrymen can tell me the finer points of actions on the objective or the details of a cordon and search, but when asked about the vehicle lineup at the start point and the movement, I get the "deer in the headlights look." Time constraint is the most common cause

DASAF'S CORNER
From the Director of Army Safety

of not following troop leading procedures. We must institutionalize doing the basics right and make leaders aware of the online Risk Management Information System (RMIS). Refining risk management training prior to deployment will provide more flexibility to deal with the less predictable tactical risk in war. Combat is fluid and requires sharpened leader skills for both air and ground operations. How often have you flown a complex air assault mission only to come home and realize there was little or no planning to get you through the forward arming refuel point (FARP) and parking? Let's get smart about training the basics.

Combat vs. Accidents



I'm not asking you to change focus in combat. On the contrary, I'm asking that you sharpen skills while in training to allow more planning time for actions on the objective. We need standardized battle drills, SOPs, and reporting procedures across our Army. When an organization understands the routine drills, then leadership can focus its energy on addressing variables. Training to standard the routine missions, such as vehicle movement, FARP operations, and formation flight over urban areas at low illumination will allow even more time for focused mission planning. Mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T) then can be focused to your actions on the objective and the variables of composite risk.

Retain the abilities of your "A" student Soldiers.

Soldiers in vehicle accidents account for more than two-thirds of our non-combat losses. Units that "get it" have significantly lower losses. I Corps CSM Barry Wheeler often refers to an "A-B-C" scale of Soldier performance. I submit that the "C" Soldiers will return from deployment and go back to the old ways of driver training and risk management. The "A" NCO will understand that driving a military vehicle has evolved into a basic Soldier skill—an evaluated CTT proficiency. The "A" leaders will train to standard based upon the lessons learned and the composite risk.

The same holds true for weapons qualification/handling and aviation training. The "A" students of modern ground warfare will require the use of Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) and ARMOX® for all qualification courses and convoy live-fire exercises. The "A" student aviators will demand training standards that reflect combat flying. Zero illumination with a hard-deck altitude is common practice in war, and we must implement training at home to retain this ability. We must not return home and allow organizations to return to the old ways. Instead, we must sustain the momentum and build upon the abilities of our returning warriors.

In World War II, America's Army lost 56 percent of its casualties to accidents. When you look at the nearly 235,000 Army Soldiers who died during that conflict, it puts 2004's 26 percent accidental death rate into perspective. However, the current number of combat losses versus accidental deaths is still at an unacceptable rate. I review every reported accident in our Army… all but a handful were preventable.

During my recent travels, a captain asked **"Should there be an H in METT-T?"** He said the H "would singularly examine (H)azards associated with the mission." In 15 months of his deployments, he had seen combat in Afghanistan and Iraq and knew firsthand about tactical risk, and had also felt the personal impact of accidental risk. He gets it!!! We need to retain our young leaders like this and use their experience. The Army depends upon the knowledge, skills, and abilities of its returning warriors. Balancing accidental risk and tactical risk is the future of risk management, a future that is in the hands of our young leaders – our next Greatest Generation.

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Our Army at War: Be Safe and Make It Home!

Joe Smith

BG Joe Smith

Hearing Loss equals Combat Casualty

SGM MICHAEL SIENDA
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Wiesbaden, Germany

It was shaping up to be just another morning patrol in Baghdad—as normal as could be expected in a war zone. Normal, that is, until KABOOM! An improvised explosive device (IED) exploded just in front of our HMMWV on the driver's side, rocking it and sending shrapnel and debris flying at us.

The concussion and noise caused ringing in my ears, and the smoke disoriented me. Then everything appeared to move in slow motion as we realized we were caught in a well-coordinated ambush. Small arms fire from about 150 meters ahead began hitting our HMMWV. Although our vehicle was disabled, the TC and I yelled at the driver to keep driving. We rolled as far as we could through the kill zone. When our HMMWV finally died, we dismounted and took cover. My driver and I both had been hit by shrapnel from the IED, and I also took a glancing bullet to my helmet. Another driver had an AK bullet impact his helmet's nametape, but it did not fully penetrate to his head. The situation was incredibly intense, but we managed to make it out without any serious injuries. We were fortunate.

I thought I had escaped unharmed, but some injuries aren't visible. For well over a month, a ringing sound persisted in my left ear. I also noticed I was hearing certain sounds differently. The possibility of permanent hearing loss concerned me, but as time passed the ringing stopped and my hearing gradually improved. However, it hasn't been the same since that day.

Loud noise and concussion are extremely effective offensive weapons. For many years, Special Operations forces and SWAT teams have used "flash bangs" or stun grenades during room-clearing operations to throw the bad guys off balance and quickly gain the initiative. This shock and violent action works well by dramatically overloading the senses and slowing reaction times. Our enemies know this, and Iraqi insurgents continue to use hundreds of roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades against us. Many Soldiers have suffered hearing injuries from these attacks.

Most Soldiers don't consider wearing hearing protection in combat. I certainly didn't. But protecting your ears is just as important as shielding your eyes, hands, and head from injury. Taking in the sights, sounds, and smells of the

Hearing Loss equals Combat Casualty

battlefield without impairment improves situational awareness and enables a faster response. My situational awareness was reduced dramatically when I needed it most because I couldn't hear what was going on around me. Hearing, along with the other senses, allows leaders to direct their Soldiers and communicate with them during the "fog of war." And, unlike other injuries, hearing loss caused by loud noise can be permanent, despite medical treatment.

After the attack, I was faced with a decision. Should I wear my old triple-flange earplugs whenever I departed our compound? Although I knew they would protect me from loud, hazardous noises if we were attacked again, that protection would come at a cost—my ability to distinguish low-level sounds, such as voices. I figured the benefit outweighed the cost, so I didn't leave the compound without them.

I'm sure I wasn't alone in this thinking. Helmets for tankers and aircrews have integrated hearing protection, but the Kevlars issued to the rest of the Army don't. Until recently, Soldiers could either wear regular earplugs or nothing at all. However, in 2001, the Army developed the Combat Arms Earplug (CAE). This special earplug protects the ear from impulse-type noise, such as weapons fire and explosions, but allows the wearer to hear normal communications and sounds on the battlefield. It's also a dual-purpose earplug. In tactical situations Soldiers insert the yellow end of the plug, leaving the olive drab end exposed. This protects against loud noises while still allowing Soldiers to hear conversations. In industrial situations, Soldiers reverse the plug and leave the yellow end exposed to protect against loud machinery noises.

The CAE is the next-best thing until the Army fields a helmet with integrated hearing protection for dismounted Soldiers. It is a significant advance and will better protect Soldiers, especially during weapons firing. The M16 is one of the Army's loudest weapons. At more than 157 decibels, it is louder than both the M2 .50 cal and MK19 Grenade Launcher. The M249 Squad Automatic Weapon is even louder at 159 decibels. Repeated firing at these elevated decibel levels without protection can cause permanent hearing damage.

Wearing the CAE takes some getting used to, especially in a combat environment, but it's worth it in the long run. Soldiers wearing the CAE gain greater confidence in their abilities, especially when firing their weapons. Because of the reduced noise, the Soldier will be less likely to flinch while firing, thereby improving accuracy.

The CAE is available under NSNs 6515-01-466-2710 and 6515-01-512-6072.

We can expect our enemies to continue using IEDs and rocket-propelled grenades against us in future conflicts. You can bet that without hearing protection, many Soldiers will return home with some form of hearing loss. Don't be one of those Soldiers—the ears you've got are the only ones you'll ever have. Take care of them!

A 19-year Army veteran, SGM Sienda has served in a variety of conventional and special mission units in the counterintelligence and security fields. At the time of this incident he was serving as the G2 sergeant major for the 1st Armored Division in Iraq. He has since returned to Wiesbaden, Germany. He may be reached via e-mail at michael.sienda@us.army.mil.

An Upsi Do Dead

Second platoon's first real combat mission in Iraq was scheduled to be a nighttime show of force. Equipped with Strykers, they were part of a larger unit and eager to get going to show what they could do.

They would be driving down some narrow, muddy roads. Although a few of the Soldiers had been down the route before, they'd been in the back of a vehicle and didn't really get a good look. The narrow road was bordered by canals and had an 8-foot drop-off on both sides. The route was very dangerous.

Earlier that day, the platoon had readied their equipment and lined up for movement. It was still daylight when they began their mission, driving the route over the muddy roads. Darkness fell just as the platoon reached the most dangerous part of the route. Because the road was barely visible, many Soldiers donned their night vision goggles as they moved.

Suddenly an urgent message came over the radio—one of the Strykers had gone off the left side of the road, rolled over, and landed upside down in the canal. In fact, although the platoon didn't know it, two Strykers more than 200 yards apart had gone off the road and rolled over into the same canal. Both vehicles were sitting upside down on their remotely operated weapons systems, with one side of the vehicle resting against the bank. Nineteen Soldiers were trapped inside the partially submerged Strykers.

Both Strykers began rapidly filling with water, which was soon up to the Soldier's chins. As they stood inside the troop compartment, the Soldiers were afraid the Strykers might tilt and allow more water to flood in.

The squad leader inside the first Stryker yelled for a head count. He thought he heard each Soldier yell back and assumed everyone was accounted for. What he didn't realize was that he heard a Soldier calling out the name of a missing Soldier as he searched for him. The driver, who also was underwater, was having trouble escaping his compartment. Equipment blocked the passageway to the troop compartment, so he couldn't escape through that route. Ultimately he got the driver's hatch open, swam out of the Stryker, and then crawled on top of it. There he was joined by one of the vehicle's air guards, who'd barely managed to get out his hatch after the vehicle rolled over.

Inside the troop compartment the second air guard struggled underwater to open the back door. He passed out, possibly not realizing the door—which would have fallen open were the vehicle right side up—now had to be pushed open. The driver and air guard who'd gotten out of the vehicle opened the rear

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door, allowing the Soldiers inside to escape. They then climbed onto the road, resuscitated the second air guard, and conducted another head count. Finding one Soldier missing, the squad leader went back inside the Stryker to find him. He found the Soldier lifeless just a few inches beneath the water's surface. His load bearing equipment (LBE) had become entangled inside the vehicle, trapping him underwater.

The water was also up to the Soldiers' chins in the second Stryker. They tried to open the troop compartment door—their only way out—but heard someone outside yelling, "There's a lock on the troop door!" The Soldiers started to panic, so the team leader tried to calm them and asked for a head count. Two Soldiers—the driver and squad leader—were missing. The driver was trapped in his compartment. Equipment in the passageway leading to the troop compartment blocked his escape. The other missing Soldier, the squad leader, was trapped underwater by his LBE. It was almost a half hour before the lock was cut and the Soldiers could escape. By then, the driver and squad leader had both drowned.

Second platoon's first mission ended in tragedy as three Soldiers died without ever engaging the enemy. It was a high price to pay to learn the following lessons:

- Before heading out, leaders must conduct risk management for the entire mission—to include the complete driving route—to mitigate the hazards.
- Leaders must brief the route to the entire platoon so every Soldier knows the hazards to be faced.
- Crews must conduct rollover drills and ensure those drills are tailored to the mission. For example, if the route follows canals, Soldiers must know what to do should their vehicle roll over and land upside down in the water.
- Rollover drills are important; however, Soldiers also need to practice exiting their vehicle. The Soldiers who died in these Strykers had survived the rollovers, but couldn't egress their vehicles. For example, had the crew in the second Stryker practiced exiting their vehicle, someone would have noticed the lock on the troop door.
- Soldiers must follow proper load plans, making sure escape routes and hatches are accessible.
- Soldiers must conduct thorough pre-combat inspections on their vehicles to ensure all equipment is serviceable and there are no locks on hatches or doors.

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A Tale of Two Convoys

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The wrong way

Worried about meeting their start point (SP) time, the convoy's leaders hurried their Soldiers through the vehicle offloading process at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD). In a few hours, three convoys had converged into a single massive line of vehicles as they waited for the rest of the vehicles to come off the ship. When the vehicles were ready to roll, theater movement control personnel divided them into two marches instead of the originally planned three convoys. The convoy was two hours late, and the convoy commander hurried through a short safety briefing so he could get the vehicles underway. None of the unit's senior officers or NCOs were at the SP site.

The lead serial turned right to link up with a local national escort. The second serial, which was led by the first sergeant, waited an additional five minutes before starting. Since he wasn't part of the previous day's route reconnaissance, he missed the right turn that led to the escort vehicles. The convoy commander failed to conduct a radio check prior to the SP, and now the first sergeant couldn't contact him by radio.

Meanwhile, the convoy commander had increased his speed to keep up with the escort vehicle. The convoy vehicles soon became separated. Even though each vehicle's senior occupant had a strip map, it was hard to

read. Furthermore, the convoy commander hadn't designated any checkpoints at the major intersections.

The result was a mess. Seven vehicles broke down along the route and were stranded until they could be recovered. As it began to get dark, elements of the second serial followed other military vehicles on a different route and ended up at the wrong base camp.

The right way

Two days prior to deploying, the convoy commander briefed the division G-4 on how he'd organized, prepared, and rehearsed his convoy. He described the risk assessment he'd conducted with his subordinate leaders and how they'd incorporated control measures into their convoy rehearsals and briefings. He also discussed the convoy personnel and vehicle manifest, route intelligence summary, and how terrain models and rock drills were being used to show convoy personnel the route. He explained each vehicle was being provided a strip map with check points. He added that convoy personnel were rehearsing ambush immediate action drills, learning how to break contact after an engagement, and how to deal with roadblocks and improvised explosive devices. He added that they'd been trained in how to call in air and ground MEDEVAC.

The division G-4 and the chief of staff were present at the SP site. Three hours before the convoy departed, the first sergeant and senior NCOs checked the vehicles to ensure preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) had been done and inspected load plans and tie-down procedures. They also conducted weapons functions checks, verified ammunition condition and status, and inspected the placement of crew-served weapons. In addition, they checked internal and external communications, including frequencies, crypto loads, and emergency call signs. They also took note of how medics and tow bars were dispersed throughout the convoy and ensured each Soldier's personal equipment included a Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Rules of Engagement (ROE) and MEDEVAC card with the nine-line report. In addition, they made sure each Soldier had extra food and water. An hour before departing, the convoy commander quizzed his personnel on their training and reiterated the importance of the convoy staying together.

The convoy deployed on time and halted twice before reaching its destination. At each halt, a 360-degree security perimeter was posted. The convoy successfully reached its destination with all its vehicles and personnel.

Some thoughts

Sometimes the benefit of a bad example is that it shows, by contrast, how things should've been done. Here are some useful lessons learned from the first convoy's experience.

- Always conduct a risk assessment and ensure leaders implement and supervise control measures.
- Rehearse convoy operations, especially emergency procedures.
- Make sure leaders know the convoy plan and route.
- Check communications to ensure you have radio contact.
- Make sure PMCS is done before departing.
- Ensure strip maps are easy to read and understand.
- Designate checkpoints so drivers can confirm they're on the proper route.
- Don't make up for being late by taking shortcuts with safety briefings and PMCS. Rushing through safety can make you later than you can afford.

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PORT OPS

GETTING THERE IS HALF TH

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Editor's Note: See all those American tanks, Bradleys, HMMWVs, and trucks running around Iraq? Before they ever fired a round or transported a Soldier to a firefight, they had to "survive" just getting there—and that might not be as simple as people think. MSG Edward Wojtowicz spent 5½ months in Kuwait observing port operations and offering safety advice at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD). The SPOD was the entry point for Army equipment arriving in theater to support Operation Iraqi Freedom I, and also the departure point for equipment being redeployed home. It was a unique experience.

Ships from around the globe arrived at the SPOD daily carrying the cargo and equipment needed to sustain the military's mission in Kuwait and Iraq. Some 300,000 pieces of equipment ranging from tracked vehicles, trucks, helicopters, and CONEX (container express) containers were loaded and unloaded in a non-stop 24-7 process. The containers were packed with food, clothing, spare parts, and equipment that units sent ahead. The task of being an observer for the Army Safety Center was challenging.

We were responsible for watching over the safety of the Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen working at the port. We watched out for vehicles going too fast for the equipment on their flatbed trailers, trailers without safety chains in place, broken pintle hooks, and improperly tied down equipment. The last category was our biggest problem. As I worked nights at the SPOD, I saw a lot of strange approaches to tying down equipment—some amusing, and some downright dangerous.

Blissful ignorance

The military had contracted third country nationals (TCNs) to deliver the stock to our desert camps. The only problem was these TCNs had never heard of MTMCTEA 55-30, so they didn't have a clue how to properly tie down military equipment. But that didn't stop them. They'd tie down an M1A1 tank with a couple of half-inch chains—one in the front and one in back—not the four three-quarter-inch chains required. And if chains weren't available, they'd

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toss nylon straps over the front and back ends of the equipment and consider it tied down. It was amusing to watch them try to tie down an M113 with nylon straps. In their home countries this might be an accepted practice, but it was very unsafe. The military finally bought 400 sets of chains to stop the TCNs from using nylon straps on large, heavy equipment. While this helped, there were other challenges.

'Creative' communication

The TCNs spoke little or no English, and we resorted to drawing pictures in the sand or on the palms of our hands as we tried to explain things. Sometimes it would work for a while, and then they'd go back to their old ways. When you tried to explain a tie down wasn't done properly, the TCNs would just say, "No problem, it's good!" So, it was back to broken pidgin language, sign language, or pictures to correct the issue. I was working one night with SFC Allen Muller, an Army Reservist from Pennsylvania, when we both got tired of using baby talk to explain tie down procedures to the TCNs. Out of frustration we climbed onto their heavy equipment transport (HET) and taught them—the best we could—proper tie down procedures. SFC Muller and I laughed quite a bit about it—that is, until the next night when we had to start from scratch with a new batch of drivers.

Traffic cops

The TCNs weren't our only safety concern. Soldiers were supposed to wear their seatbelts and Kevlar helmets whenever driving military vehicles in Kuwait. Many of the Soldiers working at the port support authority (PSA) thought they didn't need these and would offer the excuse, "We're only going 5 mph." Like good traffic cops, SFC Muller and I decided to motivate them. For Plan A, we made up a poster that read, "Wear it, click it, OR KP IT!" ("KP" refers to kitchen police duty, something most Soldiers would rather avoid.) This worked until the drivers figured out there was no KP duty at a logistical support area. After that we went to Plan B—bribery. The drivers had to stop at the ship's ramp before going down into the deployment yard, so we'd check them out and give them a piece of candy for wearing their seatbelt and Kevlar. It was a little thing, but it encouraged them to follow the rules and, at the same time, gave them and us a laugh. However, because saving lives is no laughing matter, nothing was too funny or extreme if it succeeded in getting the Soldiers to drive safely.

In closing

Protecting Soldiers and their equipment arriving in Kuwait may not be glamorous, but it's an essential part of the current mission in Iraq. Every piece of equipment lost or damaged, or every Soldier injured or killed during port operations weakens the Army's fighting power. Just as safety is essential to protecting Soldiers as they live and fight in Iraq, it's also essential to providing them the beans and the bullets to stay in the battle.

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Preparing for a Suc

SUSAN JERVIS
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Editor's Note: "Beside the Green" will be a recurring column in **Countermeasure***, courtesy of the Army Materiel Command. The column will contain safety information to help civilians and contractors support Soldiers safely.*

Our Nation is at war, and it's not just our Soldiers that are carrying out the Army's missions at home and overseas. Civilians and contractors are volunteering to deploy with our Soldiers now more than any other time in our history. Hundreds of these men and women currently are serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), facing many of the same dangers as our Soldiers.

If you're a civilian working for the Army, you're probably just as patriotic as the guy in the next maintenance bay or cubicle. When your boss announces that your organization will deploy someone for 120 days in support of OIF/OEF, you enthusiastically respond with "I'll go!" Next thing you know, you're busy packing your duffel and heading to the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) to begin in-processing and training for your new—and sometimes daunting—assignment. The following paragraphs outline some of the "essentials" you'll need to remember as you begin preparing for your deployment.

Essential 1: Physical stamina for the tough work conditions and long work hours.

The physical environment in the area of operations likely will be markedly different from your usual work environment. Many of the buildings lack accustomed levels of heating, cooling, general ventilation, and lighting. Consult your personal physician before heading to the CRC, and explain the anticipated work environment and any physical stressors you expect to encounter. Seek your doctor's advice to ensure you can function in the deployed environment. Also check the availability of any prescription medication you might need by contacting the servicing personnel center or department sponsoring the deployment. That office should be connected with the medical treatment facilities serving the area of operations.

Essential 2: Stress management tools to help ease the inherent stress of a deployed situation.

Being away from your home, family, and friends only compounds an already stressful situation and often leads to depression. To help cope, there are several stress management tools you should include in your duffel. Bring a diary to express your thoughts. Pack pictures of family and friends to remind you of good times and reinforce the reasons you want to make it home safely. And don't forget workout clothes and a good pair of athletic shoes. Even with long work hours, make time to get some type of physical exercise. Exercise helps prepare you physically and also relieves some of the tension and anxiety experienced in a deployed situation.

Essential 3: A disciplined approach to time management.

Your first thought after arriving in the operational theater may be, "How will I ever get this done?" Don't set yourself up for a fatigue-related accident in your desire to do a great job. Fatigue can lead to inattention to detail, skipped steps, and ultimately an accident. It's possible that you might work 15 to 16 hours a day, seven days a week. Manage your time appropriately by making rest a priority, and get sufficient sleep to recharge after each shift.

Essential 4: Situational awareness to keep focused on the missions at hand.

Maximize your situational awareness by paying close attention to all force protection briefings and warnings in the area of operations. As you go through the day, stay alert for unusual activities or suspicious persons. Recognize that this type of

environment will increase your stress level, so it's even more important to use your stress management tools to cope.

Essential 5: Risk management tools to ensure your personal safety.

Your duffel should include a risk management tool set. You'll need to perform a job safety analysis (JSA) for every task because of the changing work environment. Even in an administrative setting, the temporary nature of operations may create safety and ergonomic challenges. Computer setups and wiring may be temporary in nature, which can create tripping hazards and electrical hazards associated with overloaded electrical circuits. Set up your workstation so your arms, legs, and wrists remain in a neutral position, which will reduce stress on your joints and muscles and improve your physical comfort during long workdays.

Also use your JSA in maintenance and warehouse areas to make sure you aren't exposed to unnecessary risks from materials handling or other equipment, tools, or industrial chemicals. If you regularly use personal protective equipment for a similar job at your home station, use the same equipment at your deployed worksite. Check with your supervisor and local safety officer to ensure there are adequate protective devices for each task.

Don't forget to consult the Army Safety Center's Web site at **https://safety.army.mil** for references, videos, sample standing operating procedures, and other resources to help you accomplish your missions safely. Check out their site before, during, and after your deployment. Remember, "BE SAFE—MAKE IT HOME" isn't just for Soldiers. The Army needs all its personnel to make it home safely.

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

Tie It Down the Right Way!

MSG ROBERT FISHER
Ground Maintenance Safety LNO
U.S. Army Safety Center

I recently returned from a deployment to Kuwait and Iraq as part of a safety assessment team for the Army Safety Center. As anyone who's been there knows, nobody has just one duty in an operational theater. I was no exception, and one of my jobs was to ensure equipment was tied down properly in the deployment and redeployment yards.

An accident involving a piece of equipment that wasn't tied down correctly had occurred just before I arrived in theater. A light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) rolled off a heavy equipment transport (HET) trailer. Fortunately no one was hurt and there was minimal equipment damage, but the outcome could've been much worse.

The LMTV was tied down to the trailer with 5,000-pound tested cargo straps. However, someone tried using 5,000-pound cargo straps to secure a vehicle weighing 11,000-plus pounds. That was not a smart move. The cargo straps broke as the LMTV was being pulled up to the ramp for ship loading, causing the vehicle to roll off the trailer. Fortunately, it hit a stationary object—not a Soldier.

In simple terms, the wrong tie-down equipment was used. Cargo straps are for securing boxes, pallets, and other odd-shaped cargo—not heavy equipment like wheeled vehicles. The Soldiers that secured the LMTV with the cargo straps thought they were doing their task the right way. They obviously were mistaken, but we can't blame them completely. They were performing their mission the way they'd been trained—and their training was wrong.

As NCOs, we must know the correct standards if we are to train our Soldiers to standard. We cannot afford to lose equipment or Soldiers because someone "thought this was the standard." The old saying, "Tasks and conditions might change, but

STANDARDS remain the same" still holds true today, especially given the variety of conditions our Soldiers operate in throughout the world.

Tie-down procedures vary, depending on the type of equipment being transported. My team did some research and found several pamphlets that give specific tie-down guidance on the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command's Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) Web site **(www.tea.army.mil)**. We made copies of these pamphlets and distributed them in the deployment and redeployment yards.

This information became very important when a question arose concerning the responsibilities of civilian contractors, including truck drivers: Who's responsible for equipment tie down on the trailer—them or the Soldiers? The TEA's PAM 55-20, *Tiedown Handbook for Truck Movements*, says that:

"A commercial truck driver is responsible for securing exposed loads. Therefore, military personnel will rarely secure loads on commercial flatbeds. Even when military personnel load and help tie down cargo, the commercial truck driver is still responsible for ensuring that the tie-down arrangement is safe.

"The driver of a military cargo vehicle is responsible for the safety of the load. The unit is responsible for loading and unloading the vehicle. Securing the cargo is a shared responsibility between the two. The truck driver will advise in securing the load and check to ensure it is safe for movement."

The above scenario is just one example of the many potential problems encountered in deployment and redeployment yards. There isn't enough space in this article, or even this magazine, to list the proper tie-down procedures for every piece of equipment we have going into and out of theater. Be sure to visit the TEA's Web site. They have a wealth of deployment information, and you can order a CD-ROM that contains all the pamphlets we distributed and more. Be safe and make it home!

Contact the author at (334) 255-9377, DSN 558-9377, or e-mail robert.fisher@safetycenter.army.mil.

Weapons Handling 101

Large Bore

HEADQUARTERS, SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION COMMAND
Alexandria, Va.

The Army currently is in a movement between the continental United States and various operational theaters throughout the world. Troops and equipment are being packed up and shipped "from here to there and everywhere." Among that equipment is weapons. It is important to keep in mind that no matter what caliber or type of weapon, there are certain items that must be checked before shipment.

Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, M113s, and artillery pieces all have large-bore weapons. Some Soldiers think all they have to do is ensure the breech is clear and the ready loads are out. However, mistakes do occur and can have devastating consequences.

A tank recently shipped back from theater was found to have live ammunition loaded in its weapons systems. Several rounds were left in the rounding area inside the vehicle, and one round was loaded in the breach. Fortunately, the problem was found and remedied, with no Soldiers or equipment harmed.

These types of incidents are more likely to occur with battle-damaged or accident vehicles. Ensure all large-bore weapons—especially those being returned to home station—are safe before you transfer them. Take the same care and pride in doing the right thing when handling large-bore weapons as you do with your small arms.

Am I My Buddy's K

Editor's Note: In Genesis God asks the first murderer, Cain, the whereabouts of his brother, whom he'd just slain. Cain responded, "I know not: Am I my brother's keeper?" That question still is asked today when one Soldier kills another in a careless accident. The following story describes how a Soldier recklessly killed a battle buddy in Iraq, and then tried to cover it up through threats and intimidation. The Soldiers' names have been changed, but the rest of the story is true.

The three Soldiers were conducting a roving patrol around their unit's logistical support area. SGT Manning was the vehicle commander; SPC White was the driver; and a third crewmember, SPC Simpson, was the weapons operator. They were assigned a HMMWV and told by their platoon sergeant to conduct their movement at a speed not to exceed 25 mph with their headlights on.

Shortly after departing the unit, SGT Manning began complaining that SPC White was driving like an "old woman" and insisted he be allowed to drive instead. SPC White knew SGT Manning recently had been counseled by their unit commander for speeding in an Army vehicle and that he had a habit of driving aggressively.

Later on, SPC White stopped and got out to relieve himself. While he was outside the vehicle, SGT Manning moved into the driver's seat. When SPC White returned, he saw SGT Manning behind the wheel and the two argued. SGT Manning drove off and then turned around and sped toward SPC White, hitting the brakes just in time to stop short of where the driver stood.

The two continued arguing, but finally SPC White gave in and climbed into the HMMWV. SGT Manning then turned off the headlights and began speeding and doing donuts. Despite both specialists repeatedly asking him to slow down, SGT Manning's answer

eeper?

COMMAND JUDGE ADVOCATE
U.S. Army Safety Center

was, "Relax, have fun, and hold on!"

The HMMWV, its headlights off, sped through the darkness at more than 50 mph. Unable to clearly see the ground ahead, SGT Manning suddenly hit the bank of a wadi. The HMMWV flew into the air and went some 50 feet before plunging almost straight down into the ground, landing on the driver's side front fender. The HMMVW rolled, throwing all three Soldiers from the vehicle. It came to rest on the passenger side part-way down the wadi's far bank.

SGT Manning called out for the other crewmembers, but only SPC White answered. The two searched the area for SPC Simpson and ultimately found him back at the crash site, pinned beneath the HMMWV. Having found SPC Simpson dead, SGT Manning then threatened SPC White and warned him not to reveal what happened.

The threat didn't work. SGT Manning was charged with SPC Simpson's death and conspiracy to lie about the events leading up to the accident. In the trial that followed, SGT Manning was demoted to the rank of private, sentenced to seven years in prison, and will recieve a dishonorable discharged for involuntary manslaughter.

In looking at what happened, it's important to note that an involuntary manslaughter charge requires no intent or malice. A Soldier, through his or her carelessness or recklessness, can be charged with another Soldier's death. Involuntary manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for up to 10 years under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). SGT Manning wasn't trying to kill or injure his crewmembers, but his reckless behavior led to a death for which he has been legally tried and is being punished. The truth is, any Soldier exhibiting a careless disregard for the safety of himself, his subordinates, or his equipment can face legal action.

You may be wondering what action(s), if any, leaders could have taken to prevent SPC Simpson's death. On several occasions before the accident, leaders had observed SGT Manning's reckless driving. Yet they failed to take aggressive action, providing only on-the-spot corrections or informal counseling. The command could have charged him under the UCMJ's Article 92, "Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation," which carries a maximum penalty of a bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for nine months. They also could have restricted his duties to prevent him from operating an Army vehicle.

Unfortunately SGT Manning's subordinates, whom he'd threatened with violence, were reluctant to report his dangerous behavior and indiscipline. Now one Soldier is dead and another in prison while two families grieve. When counseling and informal efforts fail to motivate a Soldier to improve his behavior, stronger administrative, judicial, or non-judicial measures should be used.

PVT Manning is now serving his prison term and was unavailable for comment. However, the prosecutor contributed the following statement: "I guess if I could say anything about this case, it would be how tragic safety accidents are during combat. Soldiers understand the losses due to enemy action, but how does one explain to a family that the U.S. Government sent their Soldier across the world, only to be killed by horseplay?"

Further information on military offenses and punishments can be found online at **www.jagcnet.army.mil/laawsxxi/cds.nsf** or by speaking to your local judge advocate.

This article was prepared by Ms. Teresa Austin, Legal Assistant to the Command Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Safety Center. She may be contacted at (334) 255-9513, DSN 558-9513, or by e-mail at teresa.austin@safetycenter.army.mil.

mastering
the Master Driver Program

SSG EDWARD D. MILLS
and
SGT CHAVONE ERKINS
HHD, 702d MSB
Camp Casey, Korea

Korea is known as the second-most hazardous place to drive in the world. Driving in Korea is like dealing with a circus on a New York expressway during rush hour. Safety is the key, therefore the 702d Main Support Battalion (MSB) master drivers are going the extra mile to train Soldiers to drive safely. The Soldiers' welfare is the main motivation of the program's NCOs.

The 702d's Master Driver Program has two blocks of instruction. The first block runs 16 hours and is for specialists or corporals and above who have more than two years' military driving experience. The second block of instruction runs 40 hours and is for specialists or corporals and below with less than two years' military driving experience. In addition, every Soldier—officer and enlisted—is required to take a written exam before being issued a driver license (OF 346). Staff sergeants and above will be issued a standard license; sergeants and below will be issued a learner's permit.

Our "Training the Main" program consists of driver's improvement training (DIT), ground guiding procedures (proper hand and arm signals), hazardous material (HAZMAT) familiarization, and seasonal (spring/summer and fall/winter) training. We also cover the responsibilities of vehicle and track commanders, proper speed management, and how to perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). In addition, we instruct drivers in convoy procedures, accident procedures, how to read a map, and how to use night vision goggles (NVGs). Because driving in Korea has its own unique challenges, drivers receive a special slide show to help prepare them for the road.

Driver's improvement training highlights speed limits and rules of the road. The segment on HAZMAT familiarization trains Soldiers to identify hazardous material and teaches them how to properly haul ammunition, fuel, and other dangerous cargo. Seasonal training shows Soldiers how to adjust their driving according to the weather conditions encountered in Korea. Vehicle commander and track commander training teaches leaders their responsibilities when they're in charge of a vehicle and their role in ensuring correct safety measures are followed. The training also gives them guidance on how to take charge of convoys and what to do in case of an accident. Night vision goggles' training instructs soldiers in how to operate a vehicle at night in low or no-light conditions.

Granted, no one can prevent every accident from happening, but we can make sure that SAFETY rules are enforced. By training Soldiers to the proper safety standards, we can protect them and the civilians sharing the road with them, along with Army equipment. When Soldiers complete the Master Driver Program at the 702d MSB, they can confidently say the "Main has been trained!"

Editor's Note: SSG Mills was one of two Soldiers to receive the Sergeant Major of the Army Safety Award earlier this year. SSG Mills leads a weekly Master Driver Program that has trained more than 1,100 Soldiers to drive safely in Korea.

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

Carrying Safety into the Future

JULIE SHELLEY
Staff Editor

"You're never too young to learn." That phrase has been repeated countless times by parents across the world to children who can't seem to perform a certain task the right way. While young Soldiers certainly aren't children, leaders are responsible to ensure their troops perform their tasks safely and to standard.

However, most leaders will tell you that one of the most difficult parts of their job is getting safety through to their young Soldiers. Statistics show that young E1s through E4s are involved in fatal accidents—both on and off duty—more than any other group in the Army. How can leaders convince these "invincible" troops that safety is the way to go? The 4-23d Infantry Battalion at Fort Richardson, Alaska, may have the answer.

The 4-23d, under the leadership of LTC John Norris, recently implemented an innovative program that gives junior enlisted Soldiers "risk management ownership." The program, titled the "Unit Mission Protection Council" or UMPC, involves young Soldiers in the risk management process for each of their missions, and also incorporates off-duty safety.

The first UMPC was held at Fort Richardson this past May. LTC Norris explained to his battalion's senior leadership that young, inexperienced Soldiers should be part of the solution to the Army's climbing accident rate, not part of the problem. Since Soldiers aren't taught the risk management process during basic training or advanced individual training, chances are they won't hear about it until later in their careers. Yet, young Soldiers—the Army's future leaders—are the ones carrying out today's missions "where the rubber meets the road."

The idea behind the UMPC is to make Soldiers responsible for their own safety by involving them in the risk management process. This is accomplished by quarterly company-level practical exercises where the platoon leader walks his Soldiers through the events on the next quarter's training calendar. The Soldiers, in turn, begin by identifying the hazards and then implementing the 5-step risk management process for each task.

LTC Norris said the UMPC is based on the upcoming quarterly training calendar so Soldiers won't rush through the risk management process just before a mission begins. And once the Soldiers go out on their exercises, they'll take a small safety reminder with them. Wallet-sized risk assessment worksheets will be given to each Soldier so they can go through the five-step process before each mission.

The UMPC isn't just for tactical exercises. The effects of a long exercise or one that ends just before an extended weekend are examined for possible off-duty risks, such as POV accidents. In addition, POV inspections are performed on each Soldier's vehicle before they're released from the UMPC.

The Soldiers' response to the inaugural UMPC was wholly positive, according to LTC Norris. Many senior NCOs said they would've liked the same training early in their careers. The idea also is spreading: The 4-23d's parent unit, the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, recently implemented the UMPC as part of its training program.

The UMPC is an excellent example of the new initiatives being adopted throughout the Army to save Soldiers and cut the accident rate in half by 2005. An educated Soldier is one that's ready to take up the fight safely. For more information on starting a similar program in your unit, contact LTC Norris by e-mail at **john.norris@richardson.army.mil**.

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HMMWV 'Fingermatic' Slices and Dices

When it gets cold outside, Soldiers like to stick their fingers into the heat duct in front of the HMMWV's passenger seat. The flexible tube that attaches to the duct is often broken or missing, allowing a Soldier to stick his cold fingers inside the duct's opening. Unfortunately, the average Soldier's middle finger is a little too long to do this safely and sometimes contacts the heater fan's fast-spinning blades. The result can be cut, abraded, or sliced-off fingertips.

Think this is rare? The picture shows one of three examples I saw while serving as the surgeon for the 4th Support Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, Tikrit, Iraq. An informal poll of my medical colleagues there revealed this is a chronic problem. They were all familiar with this "syndrome."

The safety message is for Soldiers to keep their fingers out of the heater ducts! This is a preventable on-the-job injury typically caused by carelessness and a lack of common sense.

LTC Roman Bilynsky
Chief, Neurology Service
William Beaumont Army Medical Center
Fort Bliss, Texas

When 18 Wheels Trumps Two

We wanted to clarify some of the information in this story describing a motorcyclist being forced into the median by a tractor-trailer. The rider—a certified Motorcycle Safety Foundation instructor—was riding in the right lane before attempting to pass. He was listening to a CD, but was careful to clear his left and signal before changing lanes. He was alongside the trailer when the truck driver suddenly swerved into his lane.

The Editor

Joey Reassigned to Covert Unit

The "Soldier" of safety—the "roo" of risk reduction—the "magnificent marsupial of managing menace"—has left the U.S. Army Safety Center.

In a surprise announcement, Director of Army Safety BG Joseph Smith stated, "We took a leap of faith in bringing Joey to the Center. We felt Joey would give the Center a 'kinder, gentler' face—one that would inspire Soldiers to send in their personal experience safety stories and any safety questions."

Despite great expectations, all has not gone as planned.

BG Smith explained, "While e-mails to Joey poured in at first, they have 'tailed off' in recent months. The Army must get 100 percent from each Soldier, so we felt it was time for him to get hopping and approved his request for reassignment. While we can't tell you where he is, we can say he's conducting covert operations in a location where he can easily blend in with the locals.

"We will miss Joey, but every Soldier has to go where he will do the most good," BG Smith said.

ACCIDENT BRIEFS

Information based on preliminary reports of ground accidents.

AMV

Class A

- Soldier was killed when the up-armored HMMWV he was driving overturned. Two other Soldiers were injured. The HMMWV was part of a four-vehicle convoy traveling at a reported 35 mph at the time of the accident.

- Soldier died after the HMMWV he was driving overturned. The Soldier's night vision goggles reportedly washed out, causing him to steer the HMMWV into a median and skid.

- Soldier suffered fatal injuries when the HMMWV he was driving was struck by an M1A2 tank. Both vehicles were traveling in convoys—the HMMWVs north and the M1A2s south—at the time of the accident. The two vehicles collided as the convoys passed. The tank's driver was not injured.

Class B

- Five Soldiers were injured when their HMMWV was involved in an accident with a dump truck. The dump truck pulled in front of the HMMWV and then swerved back, causing the HMMWV to hit the truck. The gunner was ejected during the accident sequence, and he and the other Soldiers were hospitalized for their injuries.

Personnel Injury

Class A

- Soldier was electrocuted while taking a shower. The Soldier was found lying on the shower floor with burn marks and pronounced dead at the local medical facility. The shower room was refurbished shortly before the accident.

- One Soldier was killed and another Soldier was injured when the pool they were swimming in experienced an electrical charge. The surviving Soldier suffered a hip injury. The accident was thought to have been caused by a faulty pump.

- Soldier died after suffering numerous gunshot wounds to his abdomen. The Soldier was trying to mount an M249 Squad Automatic Weapon onto a HMMWV when it fired, striking him and causing the fatal injuries.

- Soldier suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his head. The Soldier was cleaning his 9 mm weapon when it accidentally discharged a round, striking him in the head.

Class B

- Soldier's fingers were amputated when his right hand contacted the fan on a HEMTT during maintenance. The Soldier was adjusting the HEMTT's "idle" at the time of the accident.

- Soldier's finger was amputated when his hand was pinched between a HMMWV and a trailer.

POV

Class A

- Soldier was killed after his vehicle was struck head-on by another vehicle driving the wrong direction on a four-lane highway.

- Soldier died after his vehicle struck another vehicle head-on on an interstate highway. The Soldier was driving at a high rate of speed and in the wrong direction when the accident occurred. The Soldier was drinking before the accident.

- Soldier suffered fatal injuries after he was struck by an SUV. The Soldier was attempting to cross a highway and stepped into the vehicle's path. The accident occurred during the late evening hours.

- Soldier was killed when the vehicle he was riding in hit an embankment. The civilian driver ran a stop sign just before the accident.

- Soldier suffered a permanent total disability (brain damage) after being thrown from his motorcycle into oncoming traffic. The Soldier reportedly lost control of the bike just before the accident.

Class B

- Soldier's leg was amputated below the knee, resulting in a permanent partial disability. The Soldier was riding his motorcycle when it ran off the roadway and flipped over, causing the leg injury.

Why We Wear Ballistic Goggles

Cost of one set of goggles: $55.00

Cost of the eyesight or life saved by wearing these goggles: Priceless

The soldier wearing these goggles was the victim of an IED explosion. He suffered face wounds as a result of the attack, but he will live to fight again because he was wearing his ballistic goggles. Shrapnel is embedded in the lens instead of being embedded in his eye, possibly causing blindness or death.

BALLISTIC GOGGLES SAVE LIVES. WEAR THEM!

Be Safe!

U.S. ARMY SAFETY CENTER